Companies House does email about identity verification. Read the sender backwards
- Technology
- IT consultancy
- Cyber security
- Knutsford
Companies House keeps a public list of the email domains criminals have used to impersonate it. It sits on GOV.UK, it gets added to as new ones turn up, and one of the entries on it is notification.service.gov.uk.en-uk.website.
Read that left to right and it looks like a government notification service. Read it the way a browser reads it, from the right, and it is a site called en-uk.website, with everything in front of it chosen to be reassuring. None of it is a typo. It was built to be skimmed.
The reason this particular family of fakes works so well is that the thing they are chasing you about is real.
The advice most people have been given is wrong here
Identity verification at Companies House is a legal requirement rather than an option. If you are a director, or a person with significant control, you have to prove who you are, and your company cannot file its confirmation statement until every one of its directors has done so. Companies House does email registered addresses about it.
So "Companies House would never contact you about this" is not caution, it is a false statement, and a false rule gets discarded in one piece. The director who throws it out takes the true half with it.
The true half is short. Companies House says a genuine email from it arrives from an address ending .gov.uk. The domains on its own fraud list include @companies-house-gov.uk, @companieshousesecure.co.uk, @companieshousel.ink and @cpgov.uk, next to the ordinary Gmail accounts that send the cruder attempts.
Every one of those reads correctly if you start at the left and stop when you feel satisfied.
That trick is most of the defence, and it is worth teaching to whoever opens the mail, because the same reading undoes fake couriers, fake banks and fake suppliers in the same two seconds.
What the real process never does
The genuine journey has a shape, and the fakes keep getting it wrong.
Verification happens in one of two places. Either you do it yourself through the Verify your identity for Companies House service, which runs on GOV.UK One Login and is free, or you ask an authorised agent to do it for you: an accountant or solicitor registered with Companies House and supervised for anti-money-laundering. There is no third route, and Companies House states plainly that you should not post or email your identity documents to it.
So a message that wants a passport scan attached to a reply is wrong. So is one pointing at a form that asks for documents before anything else happens, and so is the old one asking you to fax a page to a number in the email.
Three more shapes give it away. The genuine service asks questions about you rather than about your company, so a "verification" form that opens by asking for company details is already the wrong thing. It costs nothing, so a card payment to verify is a scam. And in most cases you verify once and must not verify again unless Companies House tells you to, which makes a second "verify your identity now" email, months after you verified, a very easy call.
Companies House will also never ask you for your authentication code. Not by email, not on the phone.
The prize is not only your passport
Most coverage of this scam stops at identity documents, which undersells what the criminal is shopping for.
When you verify, you get a Companies House personal code. It belongs to you rather than to any company, it goes on your confirmation statement filing and on any appointment, and Companies House tells you to keep it as securely as you would your tax reference and to share it only with people you trust.
Identity verification makes it much more difficult for criminals to impersonate someone, but not impossible.
That is Companies House's own assessment, and it tells you what the next wave of emails will ask for. Not your passport: your code, your One Login sign-in, or both. A message titled "confirm your personal code" will look far more plausible than anything circulating now, because by then the reader will have a code, and will have been told it matters.
Why these land where none of your controls are
Here is the part that makes this an IT problem rather than a filing one.
Nearly every Companies House duty belongs to the company. This one belongs to the person. The director verifies, the director holds the code, and so the correspondence goes to a director rather than to a business function. In practice that often means a personal address, read on a phone, at nine in the evening, with no mail filtering of any consequence, no colleague to turn to and no shared mailbox where somebody else might say "that one's fake, I had it this morning".
Two things help, and both are easier to do this week than during the next scare.
Decide who in the firm these go to, and tell the directors that anything mentioning Companies House goes to that person before anyone clicks. One opinion, reliably available, beats five people each assuming someone senior has already looked.
Then settle the open question, which is usually whether anyone has verified at all. If your accountant is an authorised agent and did it for you, you already have a code, and that single fact answers most of these emails on sight. Nobody can remember what they have not written down, and uncertainty is exactly what the email is selling.
- 01Do not click, reply or open attachments
- 02Read the sender address from the right: a real one ends .gov.uk
- 03If you do need to verify, type gov.uk yourself and start from there
- 04Forward the email to [email protected]
- 05Delete it from every mailbox, including deleted items
- 06For a suspicious letter or phone call, ring Companies House on 0303 1234 500
If somebody has already filled one of these forms in, treat it as a disclosure rather than a near miss: tell whoever runs your systems, change the password on the mailbox it arrived in, and report it to the address above. Nothing about that is an emergency at eleven at night, and nothing about it is improved by keeping quiet until Monday either.
The general method behind all of this is one we have written about in the context of fake HMRC messages, and it has not changed: stop trying to judge the message, and judge the route you travelled to get there. Typing an address yourself takes twenty seconds longer than clicking a link, and it works whether the email was a crude fake, an excellent one, or entirely real.
We run Microsoft 365 for our clients and built the platform our sister practice uses against the live Companies House service, so we see both the genuine filing journey and the forgeries that clients forward asking whether they are real. Send one over rather than deciding on your own.
We work with businesses across Knutsford, Alderley Edge, Wilmslow, Altrincham, Stockport and Warrington, and remotely for clients anywhere in the UK.
If any of this sounds like your business, we will tell you plainly whether we can help.
